28f9a54ba9
把 Obsidian vault 通过 MCP 暴露给 Claude.ai,OAuth 走 nas-auth。 设计文档见 vault Coding/obsidian-mcp/obsidian-mcp 设计.md。 代码层落地参考 vault Coding/obsidian-mcp/MCP 实现指南.md。 V1+V2 同时实现(用户要求跳过分阶段直接全部): 读 Tools(需 scope=read:obsidian): - list_vault_tree(一次性 vault 地图,限制深度) - list_files / read_file(含 offset/limit 大文件分页) - search(子串匹配 + glob 过滤,最多 50 hits) - get_metadata(size / modified_at / has_frontmatter) 写 Tools(需 scope=write:obsidian): - write_file / append_file - 多重门禁:scope 校验 + 路径黑名单 + 写入白名单 + 永禁文件 - 永禁写:任意目录的 AGENTS.md / PROFILE.md / README.md / CLAUDE.md / 01-Secret/** - 白名单:02-ShengquGames/logs/ + Coding/ + NAS/NAS 待办清单.md - 写入审计日志按天 rotate(JSON line) 安全: - VaultPathResolver chroot:path traversal + symlink 双拒绝 - JwtBearer (HS256, Current+Previous fallback, MapInboundClaims=false) - aud=obsidian, iss=https://auth.zhengchentao.win - 黑名单:01-Secret / .obsidian / .trash / .git 技术栈: - .NET 10 + ModelContextProtocol SDK 1.0 - Streamable HTTP transport (POST /mcp) - JwtBearer 10.0 + IdentityModel.Tokens 8.x 部署: - Dockerfile multi-stage,runtime 装 ripgrep(V3 备用),non-root user - .gitea/workflows/build-image.yml:build + deploy 双 job,buildkit v0.13.2 - 容器内 :8080,宿主端口 9090 - 子域名 obs.zhengchentao.win - vault 挂载 /volume1/docker/webdav/data/Zhengchen:/vault:rw(V2 写入需要 rw) 测试:35/35 单测过(VaultPathResolver path traversal/blacklist/symlink + VaultWriteGuard whitelist/forbidden) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
142 lines
5.4 KiB
C#
142 lines
5.4 KiB
C#
using ObsidianMcp.Config;
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using Microsoft.Extensions.Options;
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namespace ObsidianMcp.Services;
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/// <summary>
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/// Vault 路径安全守卫(chroot 语义)。
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///
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/// 职责:
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/// - 把相对路径拼接到 VaultRoot,防止路径穿越(../)
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/// - 拒绝绝对路径输入
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/// - 拒绝命中黑名单的路径段
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///
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/// 线程安全,注册为 Singleton。
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/// </summary>
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public class VaultPathResolver
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{
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// hardcode 黑名单路径段(任意路径段命中即拒)
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private static readonly HashSet<string> HardcodeBlacklist =
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new(StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
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{
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"01-Secret",
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".obsidian",
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".trash",
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".git",
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};
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private readonly string _root;
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private readonly HashSet<string> _blacklist;
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public VaultPathResolver(IOptions<VaultOptions> opts)
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{
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var o = opts.Value;
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_root = Path.GetFullPath(o.Root);
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// 合并 hardcode + env 配置的黑名单,去重
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_blacklist = new HashSet<string>(HardcodeBlacklist, StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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foreach (var b in o.Blacklist)
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if (!string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(b))
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_blacklist.Add(b.Trim());
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}
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/// <summary>返回 vault 根目录的绝对路径(规范化后)。</summary>
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public string VaultRoot => _root;
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/// <summary>
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/// 将相对路径解析为 vault 内的绝对路径。
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///
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/// 可能抛出:
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/// UnauthorizedAccessException — 路径穿越、绝对路径、命中黑名单、目标是 symlink
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/// ArgumentException — relativePath 为空
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/// </summary>
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public string Resolve(string relativePath)
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{
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if (string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(relativePath))
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throw new ArgumentException("路径不能为空。", nameof(relativePath));
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// 拒绝绝对路径输入(防止容器外访问;包括 Linux /etc/... 与 Windows C:\... / UNC \\server)
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if (Path.IsPathRooted(relativePath))
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throw new UnauthorizedAccessException(
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$"拒绝绝对路径输入:{relativePath}");
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// 把 Windows 反斜杠归一化成 Unix 分隔符,避免 Linux 容器上把 "..\\.." 当成单段不消解。
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// 注意:仅对相对路径输入做归一化;root 路径已经由 Path.GetFullPath 处理过。
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var normalizedRel = relativePath.Replace('\\', '/');
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// 拼接并规范化(自动消解 .. 和 .)
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var target = Path.GetFullPath(Path.Combine(_root, normalizedRel));
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// 确认解析后的路径仍在 vault root 内
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if (!IsUnderRoot(target))
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throw new UnauthorizedAccessException(
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$"路径穿越 vault 根目录:{relativePath}");
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// 逐段检查黑名单
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CheckBlacklist(target, relativePath);
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// 拒绝 symlink(无论指向 vault 内外,统一禁;vault 真实内容应是普通文件 / 目录)。
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// 这是兜底防线:万一 WebDAV / 操作失误把 symlink 落到 vault 里,避免 Tool 跟随到容器外。
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RejectSymlink(target, relativePath);
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return target;
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}
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/// <summary>
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/// 检查路径自身(以及任一父级路径段)是否是 symlink。是 → 拒绝。
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/// 防御链外文件 leak(例如有人在 vault 里建一个指向 /etc/passwd 的软链)。
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/// </summary>
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private void RejectSymlink(string absPath, string original)
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{
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// 从 absPath 一直向上检查到 _root(不含 root 本体;root 是已知信任的挂载点)
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var current = absPath;
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while (current != null && current.Length > _root.Length)
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{
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try
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{
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var info = new FileInfo(current);
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if (info.Exists && info.LinkTarget != null)
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throw new UnauthorizedAccessException($"拒绝 symlink 路径:{original}");
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if (!info.Exists)
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{
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var di = new DirectoryInfo(current);
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if (di.Exists && di.LinkTarget != null)
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throw new UnauthorizedAccessException($"拒绝 symlink 路径:{original}");
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}
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}
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catch (UnauthorizedAccessException) { throw; }
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catch
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{
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// I/O 异常不在这里阻断;后续真正读文件时会自然抛
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}
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var parent = Path.GetDirectoryName(current);
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if (parent == null || parent == current) break;
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current = parent;
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}
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}
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/// <summary>检查绝对路径是否在 vault root 下(含等于 root)。</summary>
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private bool IsUnderRoot(string absPath)
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{
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return absPath == _root
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|| absPath.StartsWith(_root + Path.DirectorySeparatorChar, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);
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}
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/// <summary>逐个路径段检查黑名单。</summary>
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private void CheckBlacklist(string absPath, string original)
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{
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// 把 absPath 中 root 之后的部分按分隔符拆分,逐段比对
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var relative = absPath[_root.Length..].TrimStart(Path.DirectorySeparatorChar);
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var segments = relative.Split(
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[Path.DirectorySeparatorChar, Path.AltDirectorySeparatorChar],
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StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries);
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foreach (var seg in segments)
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{
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if (_blacklist.Contains(seg))
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throw new UnauthorizedAccessException(
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$"路径命中黑名单段 '{seg}':{original}");
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}
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}
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}
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